First World and Third World after the cold war by Hobsbawm, Eric J.
This exposition is about the United States and the
Third World after the Cold War. However, this mat-
ter can only be understood in the light of the long
history of the relations between the Western countries
–the centre of the world system– and the periphery.
This history began at the end of the 15th century,
when the Europeans, after a thousand years of de-
fending themselves against invaders from Asia and
Africa, embarked on their own era of world conquest.
In  essence  (at least  for  several  centuries) this
conquest was not based on greater wealth or over-
whelming technical superiority, although scientific
and technical progress in the most important regions
of Western Europe was already more rapid and in
some aspects more advanced than in any other part of
the world. It was only in the 19th century, however,
that the enormous gap between the per capita gross
national product of the West and that of at least some
of the non-Western countries became evident.
To begin with, the superiority of the conquerors
lay in their maritime and military power, although the
latter was still relatively limited. The only really large
region conquered by the Europeans outside their own
continent was America, where, for reasons that do
not concern us here, the local empires were incapable
of resisting the invasion. In Asia and Africa, in con-
trast, up to the 18th century the Europeans were only
able to establish control over some ports, and even
then only in areas where they were not confronting
fairly large and effective States such as China and
Japan. In short, in the first two and a half centuries
European expansion was successful largely because
local conditions did not prevent it. The relative weak-
ness of the European empires was shown by their
incapacity to control the independence movements
which arose in America: neither in North America
nor in Latin America were the European States able
to resist these movements for long.1
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1 The British quickly recognized these limitations. Thus, they
did not make any serious attempt to reconquer the United States,
even though they won a war in 1812-1813, and very soon after
the Spanish colonies won their independence the British decided
to refrain from direct military interventions, even in the River
Plate region.
However, the clear technical, economic and
hence also military superiority of the centre over the
periphery grew enormously in the 19th century,
thanks to the so-called “tools of power” –gunboats,
machine  guns, artillery–  and the construction of a
worldwide support infrastructure for maritime su-
premacy. In the 19th century this infrastructure was
almost entirely in the hands of the British, who were
then the leading economic and world power.
Let us now take a brief look at the political im-
plications of this situation. First, the States of  the
centre could easily and quickly reach the world of the
periphery, but not the other way round. Great Britain
could use gunboat diplomacy against China, but
Chine could not do the same against Great Britain. In
modern terms: the United States can reach Iraq, but
Iraq cannot reach the United States. Second, in al-
most all armed conflicts between the First and Third
Worlds, the former won the battles, generally with
little difficulty.2
Third, the result was the political inferiority of
the Third World States, large or small, compared with
those of the First World, as is shown by the relations
between the United States and Mexico and between
Great Britain and China up to 1949. Up to the mid-
20th  century, only one Third World State –Japan,
which had successfully imitated the West– was able
to escape from this inferiority and thus become part
of the global power system.
Fourth, Third World States, or the Third World
as a whole, could only offset this permanent inferior-
ity with the support of one of the world powers. This
was the function of the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. The most extreme case is that of Cuba, which
has survived as a Communist regime only 170 miles
from Key West, thanks to the direct support of the
Soviets. The end of the Cold War did away with this
counterweight to the power of the developed world in
general and the United States in particular.
This raises the question: why did the First World
have to make so much use of its military and political
superiority? Could it not have simply relied on the
overwhelming advantages of its greater wealth and
economic development, which increased spectacu-
larly, especially during the Cold War? Well, it did
indeed do this during the 19th century and much of
the 20th century. We know that after the end, or with-
drawal, of the old empires of the 16th to 18th centu-
ries the sway of the First World increased, but the
incentives to turn areas of the under-developed world
into  colonies went  down during  the 19th  century,
with a few notable exceptions.3 The example of Great
Britain shows that the purely economic exploitation
of the Third World did not require direct occupation,
at any rate in the absence of another Western com-
petitor. This was the “free trade colonialism” about
which  so much has been written. However, Great
Britain naturally maintained a network of bases
which were of strategic importance or were necessary
in order to allow it to keep on controlling the interna-
tional sea routes. At first sight, the present situation
of the United States might seem similar, but I hope to
show later that there are fundamental differences.
The resurgence of colonialism at the end of the
19th century –the so-called “new imperialism”– was
due mainly to competition between rival Western
States. It is worth recalling, however, that this was a
period when, for economic and technical reasons, a
number of raw materials and commodities which are
mainly found in the Third World became vitally im-
portant and continue to be so: oil, non-ferrous metals,
rubber, and various tropical foodstuffs. These goods
caught the attention of Western businessmen and
also, as some of them were of strategic importance,
of governments too. As the history of the oil industry
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2 This did not necessarily mean  that  the powers of the First
World could win the whole war, however, unless it was a war
against local governments. It was always hard and sometimes
impossible to permanently defeat guerrilla movements in areas
which favoured them, such as the Atlas Mountains in North
Africa, Kurdistan or  Afghanistan.  The most intelligent  of  the
imperial powers, Great Britain, gave up trying to occupy and
administer such areas as the Northwest Frontier in India, and
after the First World War it contented itself with controlling this
area by periodically bombing it from the air, as in Kurdistan
today.
3 The main exceptions were the United States, France, the
Netherlands and British India. The United States was commit-
ted almost by definition to territorial expansion, which ex-
plains its conflict with its poor and backward neighbour to the
south (the war with Mexico). Border disputes with the other
developed country present in North America, Great Britain (in
Canada), were settled peacefully by diplomatic means. For do-
mestic policy reasons, France was committed to the conquest
of Algeria, in the Southern Mediterranean, which was an area
also used for European migration. The Netherlands and Great
Britain (or rather the Dutch and British East India Companies)
found, for reasons that do not concern us here, that after set-
ting up territorial bases in India and Indonesia they had to
expand those bases until they became great colonies.
shows, however, the exploitation of this product did
not necessarily call for colonial occupation.4
If we take a historical view, we can see that the
new era of colonialism (of empires which insisted on
direct occupation and administration) proved to be
relatively short. Direct colonialism was a temporary
fashion which only lasted a short time. Indeed, it can
be contained within the lifetime of a single person:
for example, that of Winston Churchill, who lived
from 1874 to 1965. Since the industrial revolution,
capitalism has needed  to  create a world economy
dominated by the capital accumulation centres, but
this does not necessarily require a formal colonial
system.
A recent development has brought in a new ele-
ment in this respect, however. In the last quarter of
the twentieth century, the centre of gravity of the in-
creasingly globalized world economy has begun to
shift to some extent from the original capitalist coun-
tries to the Third World, especially in manufacturing.
Moreover, since the rise of the Japanese economy
and the oil crisis of the 1970s, native capital accumu-
lation outside Europe and North America has become
much more important than before.5 This change was
hastened by the enormous and growing difference
in income between the First and Third World, which
furthered  the  transfer  of labour-intensive forms of
production from high-wage areas to those of low
wage levels (a well-known phenomenon in the case
of Mexico). Likewise, this heightened the de-indus-
trialization of the oldest industrial regions of the First
World.
Thus, economically  speaking, the international
economy can no longer be considered as being di-
vided simply between  a First World concentrating
most of the production and marketing of industrial
goods and a Third World linked with the former as a
producer of raw materials, although possessing an in-
dustrial sector based on the domestic market, as for
example through import substitution (I will not refer
to the more tightly closed economies of the socialist
Second World which have now ceased to exist (like
the former Soviet Union) or have changed their poli-
cies (like China). Today, the Third World includes
the fastest-growing industrial economies and the
most export-oriented industry. As long ago as the late
1980s, over 37% of United States exports already
came from the Third World, while almost 36% of its
exports went to the latter.
For this reason, the economic superiority of the
First World is no longer due to the fact that it is the
most highly industrialized region or that it has the
most “advanced” economy, except in one respect:
that up  to  now it continues to almost monopolize
scientific and technological research and develop-
ment.6 Leaving aside this field, the First World’s su-
periority lies in operating as an economic-financial
conglomerate rather than a mere production plant. It
houses the head offices of most of the great transna-
tional corporations, which, with all their local branches
and subsidiaries, account for a large part of the world
economy. It has the faculty of laying down the frame-
work for the world economy and its institutions, such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, which it controls, and its immense wealth al-
lows it to manage the greater part of world invest-
ment capital flows.
At the same time, however, this superiority
makes the First World more dependent on what hap-
pens in the Third World. From the economic point of
view, it is now much more important than before to
have some degree of political control, especially in
the case of the United States, which is the leading
power in present-day capitalism. Until after the end
of the Second World War, that country’s economic
development was based on its domestic market, and
protecting its industry from foreign competition was
traditionally much more  important  for  it  than free
trade and export promotion. Although some specific
branches of United States business and finance were
deeply committed in one or another part of the Third
World economy (the United Fruit Company, for ex-
ample), the United States economy as a whole did not
depend on its links with the Third World, unlike
Great Britain, which had been the leading power in
the nineteenth century.
This brings us to the specific matter that we will
deal with here, which is the international position and
policies of the United States after the Cold War.
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4 The division of the world into colonies was confined to Africa
and the Pacific. The Americas were hardly affected, nor were
those parts of continental Asia which had not already been con-
quered,  except  for  those  which became the  area  of  territorial
expansion of Japan in East Asia.
5 Before the 1970s, even Japan -although a major military power
since the beginning of the twentieth century- generated no more
than 5% of the world industrial product.
6 Even now, at the end of the present century, only a few Asians
or Latin Americans have won a Nobel Prize in the sciences, and
a number of those who have done so have worked or are work-
ing in Europe or the United States.
The United States now occupies a position which
has no precedent in history. It is the only real world
power. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain occu-
pied a position which was similar in many respects,
as the only power with  global interests, since the
other countries, including the United States and Ja-
pan, only had regional interests. In politico-military
terms, however, Great Britain was only one of several
powers, although in one respect it outstripped them
all until the twentieth century: the British Navy was
bigger than all the others put together, although this
only lasted until other powers, especially the United
States and Japan, began to build up powerful naval
forces themselves. But  the present position of  the
United States is very much stronger, in both relative
and absolute terms. There is no foreseeable possibil-
ity of any other power competing with its nuclear and
aerial might. Since the collapse and disintegration of
the Soviet Union, there is no other State or combina-
tion of States which could even dream of challenging
it militarily.
For this reason, I think it is important to compare
these two positions of dominance. It seems to me that
there are three main differences between them, which
are not unconnected with each other. Unlike Great
Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States is
an ideological empire (as Revolutionary France and
the Soviet Union were in their day). Perhaps for this
reason, the United States empire (unlike the British
Empire) seeks to transform the world into its own
image and likeness. In practice, this aspiration is su-
perimposed on that of world political and military
domination. The lust for control is political, not just
economic:  although in  the  present world situation
free trade is in line with the United States’s interests,
that country’s basic attitude has been to protect and
foster United States capitalism through political ac-
tion. Unlike Great Britain in the nineteenth century,
the United States has a long history of military inter-
vention abroad.
In the days of the Pax Britannica, things were
different. As it was only a relatively small country,
Great  Britain could  not allow itself  the luxury of
megalomania. Its European policy, for example, was
based on the “balance of power”. It did not aim to
become the mightiest European power, but it did take
care to ensure that the stronger powers were always
at daggers drawn with each other, while Britain re-
mained on the sidelines of the disputes. As successful
pioneers in world industrialization, the British had
enormous confidence in their economic system.7
They were also convinced that their political system
was superior to all others, but they did not promote it
as a general model.8 When nineteenth-century Britain
did become a model for others, this was by example
and not by design, as in the case of men’s fashions
and internationally popular sports, almost all of
which were of British origin.
The Pax Britannica was thus very different from
the Pax Americana, except that the British Navy, in
the days when it ruled the waves, took the main re-
sponsibility for international maritime vigilance
against such activities as piracy and (after its prohibi-
tion) the slave trade. Great Britain recognized its
limitations. No British Foreign Secretary, not even
Palmerston, would have referred to any part of the
world whatever in the terms that Secretary of State
Olney used with regard to the Western Hemisphere in
1895, when he declared that the United States was
now practically all-powerful  in that  continent and
that when it took up a matter its decisions had the
force of law, because apart from all the other consid-
erations, its unlimited resources and its position of
isolation meant that it was in total control of the situ-
ation and was practically invulnerable to any or all
other powers.
United States policy has therefore consistently
been one of interventionism, first within the Western
Hemisphere and subsequently all over the world. Great
Britain had many colonies but no satellite States, ex-
cept for what has been called “Britain’s heyday in the
Middle East”, between 1918 and 1958. The United
States has had very few colonies, but its aim has been
to build up a system of satellite States. We may recall
that the typical modus operandi of the United States
intelligence service, the CIA, is to combine intelli-
gence work proper with covert political actions.
Furthermore, as we have already seen, first
within the Western Hemisphere and then worldwide,
United States policy has been based on the acknow-
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7 So much so that they unilaterally adopted free trade and kept it
up for almost a century, although no other State joined them in
this: a highly beneficial policy for an economy based on trade
with the Third World.
8 They considered that, regrettably but inevitably, the French
and Americans would never be like them, while although the
Russians would be better with stable laws and civil liberties they
would still be quite un-British. As for the Third World, the Brit-
ish were convinced -mainly on the basis of their experience in
governing India- that most of its inhabitants were permanently
unfitted for the exercise of freedom.
ledgement of its overwhelming power –both eco-
nomic and technico-military– in its area of influence:
a power that it has always been ready to use when
necessary and which demands some degree of public
acceptance  and consideration on the part  of other
States. The older powers, accustomed to the conven-
tions and practices of diplomacy, had not generally
made such demands. The assumption  –clearly  im-
plicit in the Helms-Burton Act– is that the United
States is so indispensable to the rest of the world that
it can use its national power to oblige other States to
comply with United States policies even within the
jurisdiction of their own territory.
During the Cold War, all this was justified on the
grounds of the Soviet menace and accepted by the
United States’s allies and satellites as the price that
had to be paid to keep Washington happy.9 But what
is the situation today? The list of interventions since
the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet threat no
longer exists, is surprisingly long. It includes Panama
in 1989, the Gulf War in 1991, Haiti in 1994, and
various operations which had humanitarian or peace-
keeping   objectives but nevertheless involved the
direct participation of United States forces, from Li-
beria and Somalia up to the Iraqui sector of
Kurdistan and Bosnia. The most recent examples are
the bombing raids on the Sudan and Afghanistan.
Indeed, as one United States author has noted,
there is an ongoing conviction that military interven-
tion is always likely to be the final response of the
United States (Down, 1997, p. 202). Why is this so?
Because other methods of asserting United States in-
fluence have come to be less effective, and because
the real need for that country to continually assert its
supremacy has increased. United States economic aid
has drastically diminished, especially since the adop-
tion of the Graham-Rudman-Hollings Act in the mid-
1980s, and this has weakened a traditional means of
influencing  other States. The success of economic
sanctions, to which the United States has been
strongly addicted, has gone down since the early
1970s, perhaps because the United States economy
has lost relative weight or because such sanctions are
no longer suitable for achieving particular objectives
such as respect for human rights or controlling drug
trafficking. Para-military and covert actions have had
dubious results, although they have undoubtedly been
very effective for harassing governments that the
United States disapproves of and upsetting their func-
tioning (Angola is a lamentable example of such
cases). Furthermore, such actions are no longer so
effective for overthrowing hostile governments as
they were in the 1950s. In any case, they are not a
weapon that can be used unilaterally, since they re-
quire the aid of a local ally (Schraeder, 1992, p. 149).
At the same time, the globalization of the econ-
omy has meant that the activities of transnational cor-
porations (regardless of their country of origin) are
now more dependent on the goodwill of the authori-
ties of the country where they operate. The Helms-
Burton Act seeks to bar from United States territory
all foreigners whose economic activities in other
parts of the world are not to the taste of the U.S.
government. But  this principle  is applicable to all
States.10 A country with such a long protectionist tra-
dition as the United States has always been keenly
aware of this political element in its foreign trade,
which is very evident, for example, in the almost con-
stant pressure by Washington on Japan for the latter
to allow more United States imports to enter its terri-
tory. Naturally, the United States refrains from openly
threatening States which it does not consider as ad-
versaries or which are so weak as to be insignificant.
It does consider it to be desirable, however, that eve-
ryone should be well aware that it can use what Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt called “the big stick”.
Consequently, since  the end of the 1980s the
United States has worked out a systematic doctrine of
what it calls “low-intensity conflict” suitable for the
post-Cold War era. This is no longer based on the
idea of preparation for a major war, but it does pro-
vide for the direct and if necessary armed interven-
tion of Washington’s allies or of the United States
itself. Indeed, the end of the Cold War –that is to say,
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9 Intervention in the internal affairs of other States, which has
been officially acknowledged, albeit only indirectly, became
normal practice (in  Central America, Africa since the 1960s,
West Asia, etc.), although it violates the legal principle of non-
intervention which has been formally recognized since the First
World War. This probably explains why the United States justi-
fies most of its interventions, even in the unconvincng case of
Grenada, on the grounds of “self-defence”.
10 Without national authorization for aircraft to land there can be
no international air traffic. The proposed merger between Ameri-
can Airlines and British Airways depends on a political decision
between Washington and the European Union on the number of
flights of these two airlines that are to be allowed to land at
Heathrow Airport.
the end of the danger of a world war– has loosened
the brakes on the war machine. The Gulf War would
not have been possible before this. President Bush
himself proclaimed the new doctrine, declaring that
the United States and its allies must build a common
strategy to ensure stability in the developing world.
And what are the threats to that stability? They are
insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking, he said.
This means –in the words of Defense Secretary
Cheney– that greater reliance must be placed on
highly mobile forces prepared for immediate action
and, in the jargon of the Pentagon, “with solid power-
projecting capabilities”, that is to say, with capacity
for massive long-distance military intervention. As a
result, in recent years we have witnessed a number of
highly visible examples of the United States capacity
to intervene at a moment’s notice anywhere in the
world, no matter how far it may be from military
bases on United States territory. We may recall in this
respect the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and, a couple
of months ago, an exercise involving parachutists in
one of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
At this point in our analysis we must ask our-
selves: what is the capacity and what are the limits of
this global military leadership? We will now make a
few comments in this respect.
First of all, there is a growing gulf between the
size and resources of the United States and those of
the world dominated by it. I do not mean to say that
the United States is in danger of what Professor Paul
Kennedy of Yale has called “imperial overstretch”:
that is to say, imperial ambitions out of proportion to
the available resources. Since the end of the Soviet
Union there is no other military power that can com-
pete with it, and as there is no danger of a major war
at present, the United States can probably maintain its
military supremacy without too much of an economic
effort. However, although the United States currently
accounts for no more than 5% of the world popula-
tion yet generates 10 to 20% of world industrial
output, the latter proportion is tending gradually to
diminish.
Consequently, the United States is not really any
more capable of “controlling” the world in the
twenty-first century than the British were in the nine-
teenth century. Trying to maintain the political stabil-
ity of the world is a reasonable  objective for the
United States, but imposing this through its military
or economic power is beyond its possibilities. The
most dangerous aspect is that despite its present pre-
dominant position this country  lacks both a diplo-
matic tradition and an objective awareness of its limi-
tations.
Secondly, in spite of all its might, when acting
alone the United States can only exert a relatively
modest and limited amount of power. It needs allies
abroad, because many of its military bases and much
of  its world  infrastructure are on foreign  territory.
This is where there is a difference with the British
hegemony in the nineteenth century, because the
bases of  the British maritime control  system  were
British property: Gibraltar, the Falklands, Malta, Sin-
gapore, Hong Kong, and so forth. In 1973, even
though it dominated the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), the United States did not have free
use of its allies’ air bases in peacetime. Moreover,
United States domestic policy now places limits on
military intervention, especially in most of the “low-
intensity conflicts” envisaged in its late-twentieth
century world strategy, because these conflicts often
cannot be fought by remote control but involve
ground troops. Bosnia and Chechenia are good exam-
ples of this. It is well known that United States public
opinion always wants military victories, but only if
they do not involve the loss of American lives. In
order to overcome this problem it would be necessary
to change both the structure of the United States mili-
tary forces and American public opinion, and while
this is not impossible, it has not yet occurred.
Thirdly, there are vast areas of the world –Africa,
much of Asia, and even Eastern Europe– where we
are currently witnessing the effective disintegration
of States or a whole system of States. It is by no
means clear how useful the new United States doc-
trine will be for dealing with “low-intensity con-
flicts” in such situations of instability. Clearly, in the
event of war the First World would undoubtedly win
all its battles against the Third World. But what about
afterwards? Who would ensure stability? And where,
in these unstable regions, would it be possible to find
governments that were sympathetic to the West,
docile, yet also capable of staying in power? When
they  look at what is happening in vast regions of
Africa, some deeply discouraged observers wonder
whether it would not be better to re-colonize those
territories. This is no longer possible, however. The
secret of the imperialism of the past -i.e., the passiv-
ity of the great majority of colonized peoples under
their conquerors- has been lost. In any case, there is
now such an abundance of highly effective and easily
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portable arms and explosives in the world that huge
outlays of men and resources are needed to deal with
quite small groups of armed activists: an outstanding
case is that of Northern Ireland, where there are no
more than 500 or so active guerrillas. In these cir-
cumstances, the cost-benefit calculations become
highly unfavourable, and governments tend to be
acutely aware of this in almost all cases where the
territorial integrity of their countries is not directly
threatened. It may be noted that in Africa the non-
African armies –even that of France, after forty years
of interventionism– are withdrawing from the conti-
nent.
So, what does the military supremacy of the
United States really count for? How far will it condi-
tion the behaviour of other countries?
I believe that the most effective use of the “big
stick” is through the maintenance of the United States’
virtual monopoly in the field of high-technology
weapons. That country has a dual politico-military
strategy: on the one hand it seeks to make its allies’
military forces dependent on United States technol-
ogy and supplies, without which they cannot operate,
and on the other hand it seeks to prevent current or
potential adversaries from producing high-technology
weapons or obtaining them elsewhere. It may be as-
sumed in this respect that the United States’ relations
with Iraq since the Gulf War mark the future pattern
of its policy with regard to small and medium-sized
States which refuse to submit to it. However, they
also show the limits of Washington’s strategy.
There  remains another problem  which is ex-
tremely serious both for the United States and for the
First World as a whole: how to protect their economic
superiority against the migration of the production
centres of the global economy to the Third World.
Although this problem is not yet a matter of immedi-
ate urgency   for the First World, since China has
not yet become a great world economic power, the
politico-military hegemony of  the  United  States is
not capable of stopping this process. America does
have two powerful weapons, however: its wealth, and
the fact that it is indispensable for the functioning of
the world economy. The aim of the old centres of
economic power in general and of the United States
in particular is none other than to keep the world
economy under their control. Universal free trade has
always been the favoured programme of the econo-
mies that dominate world trade, as it now is of the
United States.
However, we must always bear in mind that the
rise of the newly industrialized countries, and espe-
cially the economic miracles of the “Asian Tigers”,
have been based on rejection of the neoliberal free-
market theology. As these newly industrialized
economies, which are relatively weak and almost al-
ways heavily indebted, become incorporated into the
global economy they become vulnerable to the pres-
sures of the International Monetary Fund and other
centres of international credit, in which the political
weight of the United States is predominant. In South
Korea –under the pressure and with the aid of the
United States– the Fund wants to impose neoliberal-
ism (including the right of foreign firms to purchase
control of Korean enterprises) on an economy which
has achieved in thirty years the most rapid transfor-
mation ever known from a poor and backward agri-
cultural country into one of the most important
industrial economies in the world, with an almost un-
precedented rise in the standard of living and political
progress from a developmentalist military dictator-
ship to something close to democracy. The aim be-
hind this pressure is no doubt to break any economic
models which run counter to  global neoliberalism
and any States or groups which stand in the way of
such global restructuring.
Is the economic strength of the United States
sufficient to maintain this control? The situation
cannot last for ever: in the long run the predomi-
nance of the United States cannot survive the future
growth of the global economy, that is to say, the
relative decline in the weight of the United States
economy. Up  to  just  a  short  while ago, I would
have said that we are still solidly in the era of free
trade, and moreover we are not confronting only
the politico-economic power of the United States, but
also a powerful orthodox ideology. The most danger-
ous legacy of the 1970s and 1980s has been the con-
version of most economists to the theology of
absolute neoliberalism.11 The consequences of eco-
nomic programmes of this nature have already
proved to be fatal in the regions where “real social-
ism” previously prevailed, and they have had results
which can be described at the very least as dubious
in the case of Mexico. The developing countries,
including those of Latin America, are living under
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11 This is clear from the nominations for the Nobel Prizes in
economics since 1975.
both the politico-economic pressure of Washington
and the ideological pressure of an intellectual consen-
sus devoid of both historical and social realism.
In  the last  few months, however, there have
been significant changes even in the preferences of
those responsible for awarding the Nobel Prize. The
heyday of consensus among economists, of the utopia
of capitalism without any problems, of neoliberal
fundamentalism, is coming to an end, and it has been
discovered that the future of the world does not nec-
essarily lie in the universalization of the model based
on United States capitalism.
It is therefore much clearer now than it was be-
fore that there are limits to the United States’ hegem-
ony over the world economy, just as there are limits
to its military and political hegemony.
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